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Abstract
We use the structure of media markets within states and across state boundaries to study
the relationship between television and electoral competition. Specifically, we compare in-
cumbent vote margins in media markets where the content originates in the same state as
the media consumers versus those where the content originates out-of-state. This contrast
provides a clear test of whether television coverage correlates with the incumbency advan-
tage. We study Senate and Gubernatorial races from the 1950s through the 1990s. We find
that the effect of TV is small, directionally indeterminate, and statistically insignificant.
1. Introduction
The incumbency advantage is one of the most well-documented features of elections in
the United States today. A large body of research has established that the incumbency
advantage grew from roughly 1 or 2 percentage points in the 1940s to 8 to 10 percentage
points in the 1990s.1 The causes of the incumbency advantage and reasons for its dramatic
growth, however, remain a puzzle.
The search for the origins of the incumbency advantage have gradually turned from the
specific to the general. The incumbency advantage was first noted in U. S. House elections
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and it has driven much of the subsequent scholarship
on federal and state legislative elections. In addition, it has been found that incumbents
in nearly every state and federal office hold roughly similar electoral advantages, and the
incumbency effect grew at roughly the same rate and at approximately the same time for all
offices.2 The search for the cause of legislators’ incumbency advantages, then, has become a
search for a general cause of incumbency advantages. There are a wide variety of plausible
hypotheses, including the decline of party, interest group politics and campaign practices,
and the growth of government.3
One important possible explanation is rise of television. Erickson (1995), drawing on the
literature on US House and Senate elections, has laid out the logic elegantly:
“the entrenching of incumbency seems to have coincided with the rise of televi-
sion. Media scholar Robert Lichter (Lichter et al., 1986: 7) marks 1958 as the
year ‘the age of television began,’ when the number of televisions approximately
equaled the number of American homes. Perhaps not coincidentally, 1958 is also
the precise year that the power of incumbency took off, according to Alford and
Brady’s analysis. By 1960... television was clearly having a powerful political
effect. And if television is the engine to reelection, money is the fuel. With a
full-time fundraising staff, incumbents have long had an advantage when it comes
to building campaign war chests (Jacobson 1980, Malbin 1984). Television both
decreased the unit cost of reaching voters, and provided the political process with
1The literature is massive. A sampling of different estimation techniques and results is found in Erikson
(1971), Alford and Brady (1989), Gelman and King (1990), Levitt and Wolfram (1997), and Ansolabehere,
Snyder and Stewart (2001).
2For a comparison of many offices see Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002).
3On the decline of party see Cover (1977); on campaign contributions and interest group activities see
Jacobson (1980); on the rise of government see Fiorina (1980).
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a medium that was revolutionary in terms of its capacity to create public images.
It maximized the impact of campaign funds by making possible, like never before,
a personal appeal to voters.”
Survey research provides further evidence of a possible link between television and the incum-
bency advantage. In general, incumbents receive more media coverage than their opponents
(Robinson, 1981; Clarke and Evans, 1983; Goldenberg and Traugott, 1984; Graber, 1989;
Kahn, 1991). Survey respondents who recognize a candidate are more likely to vote for that
candidate (Jacobson, 1987), and respondents who have higher levels of overall media use
(the questions are not specific to television) are more likely to vote for incumbents (Goidel
and Shields, 1994). In addition, campaign managers evidently believe that television is the
single most important communication medium (Hernsson, 1995), and incumbents typically
spend much more on television than challengers.
A series of studies, beginning with Campbell, et al. (1984), seek to establish a direct
link between television and electoral competition. The general approach is to measure the
extent to which the structure of media markets effects election results and voting behavior.
One set of studies constructs a measure of media market “congruence” or “fragmentation” in
congressional districts or states. Campbell, et al. (1984), Niemi, et al. (1986), and Levy and
Squire (2000) find that congressional challengers fair better in districts that more closely
match media market boundaries (congruence). Reynolds and Stewart (1990) find that in
states with many different television markets (fragmentation) incumbents garner a greater
share of the vote. In both cases, the inference is that an ease in communicating via television
reduces the incumbency advantage.
Prior (2002) introduces another measure of television in congressional districts – the num-
ber of television stations. He examines whether the number of televisions stations reaching
a congressional district predicted the vote choice of respondents in to the National Election
Survey from 1958 to 1970. He finds a significant relationship between the number of televi-
sion stations and identification with the incumbent party, but insignificant direct effects of
the number of television stations on intention to vote for the incumbent. He argues that there
is an indirect effect of television on incumbency, operating through party identifications, and
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estimates that effect to be in the neighborhood of 1 to 2 percent of the total vote.4
We propose an alternative way to measure the effect of television on electoral competition.
We compare the incumbent vote margins in statewide elections in two different types of
media markets – in-state media markets and out-of-state media markets. An in-state media
market is a media market centered within a given state. The Milwaukee media market is
an in-state media market for Wisconsin. An out-of-state media market is a media market
centered in a city outside of a given state but which covers some part of a neighboring state.
The Minneapolis media market is the primary media outlet for the counties of southwestern
Wisconsin. News in the Minneapolis media market focuses on Minnesota state politics and
elections, not Wisconsin politics and elections. As a result, voters in southwestern Wisconsin
receive much less television coverage of their state’s politics than voters covered by in-state
media markets such as Milwaukee.
Contrasting counties in in-state media markets and out-of-state media markets provides
a better measure of the effects of television on the incumbency advantage for two reasons.
First, the measure is more clearly a function of actual television coverage than other measures
of media market structure, such as fragmentation or number of television stations. As noted
below, television coverage of a state’s governor and other statewide officers is many times
larger in in-state media markets than in out-state media markets. There is no evidence
that fragmentation, congruence, and number of television stations correlate strongly with
television coverage or advertising.5 Second, we can hold constant the candidates running,
4He specifies a hierarchical system of equations in which television predicts incumbent party identifications
and then identifications plus television predict vote choice. One must include party identifications in the
second equation to avoid omitted variable bias. There is the possibility that the system is truly simultaneous,
in which case an instrumental variable estimator is required. The equation predicting vote choice as a function
of number of television stations, identification with the incumbent party, and other factors yields a coefficient
on number of television stations of approximately .02 with a standard error of .03; the coefficient on party
identification is large and highly significant.
5Ansolabehere, Gerber, and Snyder (2002) measure the costs of television advertising directly using
data on actual advertising rates, district by district, and find only a small correlation between congruence,
fragmentation, and cost. Also, it is not clear that the number of television stations is a good proxy for
media coverage. Indeed, expectations might run counter to the estimated effects. For example, suppose that
television covers prominent personalities. In a district with one television station and one House member,
the House member might receive a lot of coverage, as he is relatively prominent person. But, in a city
with many House members and many television stations, House members may receive little or no television
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the closeness of the election, and other features of the race. The same two candidates are
running in all counties within a state. Voters in in-state media markets and in out-state
media markets face the same electoral choices. This is an advantage over previous studies
since they typically do not control for key variables such as candidate quality or type of
district. Such controls are automatic in our study.
Our basic finding can be summarized as follows: We find no evidence that the incumbency
advantage is systematically higher (or lower) in counties with in-state media markets than in
counties with out-of-state media markets. Therefore, we doubt that television is responsible
for the rise of the incumbency advantage.
2. Methodology
2.1 Study Design and Evidence
Media markets definitions are based on viewing patterns and do not respect state bound-
aries. A given media market may be concentrated in a city in one state and cover rural and
suburban counties of a neighboring state. Examples include the Minneapolis-St. Paul Media
Market which includes western Wisconsin, Chicago, which includes parts of Indiana, Denver
which includes western Nebraska, Providence, RI, which includes Massachusetts, Pittsburgh
which includes the panhandle of Maryland, and Atlanta which includes northeastern Al-
abama.6
Figure 1 shows a map of Massachusetts with the counties classified to as in either in-
state or out-of-state media markets in 1980. In 1980, as well as 2000, Berkshire county
(in the far west) was part of the Albany, NY media market and Bristol county (in the
southeast) was part of the Providence, RI media market. During 2003-2004 two major
network affiliates in Boston mentioned Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney 194 times and
coverage (the mayor is likely to be much more prominent than any individual House member).
6The two most widely used are Designated Market Areas (DMA’s), constructed by Nielson, and Areas
of Dominance Influence (ADI’s), constructed by Arbitron. According to Arbitron, “The Area of Dominance
Influence [ADI] is a geographic market design that defines each television market exclusive of the others,
based on measurable viewing patterns. Each market’s ADI consists of all counties in which the home market
stations receive a preponderance of viewing, and every county in the continental U.S. is allocated exclusively
to one ADI” (Broadcasting-Cable Yearbook, 1990).
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255 times respectively.7 Meanwhile, a Providence, RI network affiliate mentioned Romney
only 29 times. In Albany, NY two network affiliates mentioned Romney 10 and 3 times
respectively. Such levels of mention are likely the same as “noise” – for example, a network
affiliate in San Francisco, CA mentioned Romney 4 times in the same period.8
Figure 2 shows a map of Illinois, also from 1980. The in-state media markets (in the
northeast corner) are Chicago, Champaign, Peoria and Rockford, IL. The out-of-state dom-
inated media market (in the southeast) is Evansville, IN. The other counties are in media
markets that are not clearly dominated by a state - these media markets are Davenport,
IA, Paducah, KY, Peoria, IL, St. Louis, MO and Terra Haute, IN. Counties in these media
markets were removed from our study.9 Focusing on the counties in in-state vs. out-of-state
dominated markets we find that in twelve months between 2003 and 2004 Illinois Governor
Rod Blagojevich was mentioned 95, 64 and 280 times by three Chicago network affiliates.
During the same time period two network affiliates in Evansville, IN mentioned Blagojevich
9 and 5 times.10
The anecdotes above illustrate the central assumption of our research design: In-state
and out-of-state media markets differ in their coverage of politics of a particular state. This
difference is commonly asserted in studies that examine media market fragmentation. Since
television is the primary source of political news (Ansolabehere, Behr and Iyengar 1993),
any viewer in an out-of-state media market will receive much less information about the
candidates than viewers in an in-state media market.
The reasons for the differences are two-fold. First, a news director of a television station
needs to decide how to best utilize a small number of reporters and limited air-time in order
to satisfy the largest percentage of her customers. If most of her customers live in a single
state, she will no doubt choose to report more heavily on upcoming elections in that state.
7A network affiliate is one that carries a majority of their programming from one of the major networks:
ABC, CBS, NBC or FOX.
8Data on mentions was collected from the following URLs: http://www.wcvb.com, http://www.wbz.com,
http://www.wlne.com, http://www.fox23news.com, http://www.wnyt.com and http://www.kron.com
9See Table 3 and Appendix B for further explanation.
10Data on mentions was collected from the following URLs: http://www.cbs2chicago.com,
http://www.nbc5.com, http://www.abc7chicago.com, http://www.weht.com and http://www.14wfie.com
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People who live in counties that are in out-of-state media markets will see very little, if
any, coverage of the political races that affect them (Stewart and Reynolds, 1990). Second,
political campaigns for statewide office face a similar resource allocation problem. They
too have limited resources, and it is very expensive on a per voter basis to advertise in an
out-state media market.
Although this assumption is frequently made in other studies of media markets, we are
the first to document the differences in free and paid media between in-state and out-of-state
media markets.
News Media Coverage of Incumbents
We conducted a comprehensive analysis of news coverage of governors on 90 stations in
51 media markets. For each media market, we searched the on-line archives of the three
network affiliated stations for stories that mention the governors of states covered by that
media market.11
Table 1 gives the overall number of stories about states’ governors. The table presents
the results for all 51 markets, as well as examples from the ten most populous media markets
of the 51 we surveyed. Overall, we found that news programs aired 10 times as many stories
about the in-state governor than they did of governors from neighboring states covered by
the media market. The number of stories about the out-of-state governors was typically
extremely small, and on the order of noise.
An interesting exception arises in Chicago. Indiana Governor O’Bannon received a large
amount of attention on Chicago television in 2002. The reason? He suffered a stroke and died
in Chicago. Almost all of the coverage of the Indiana governor came after his death. Reading
of the stories of the in-state Governor suggests that most of the coverage is about day-to-day
state politics, such as the budget, staged events such as entertaining foreign dignitaries and
press conferences, and responses to natural disasters.
11In general the archives went back about a year, with no archive spanning a shorter time than 6 months,
or predating 2000. We have focused on stories from January, 2003, to April, 2004.
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Paid Media: Campaign Advertising
Using data gathered by Wisonsin Advertising Project12 we can examine the advertising
patterns of Senatorial and Gubenatorial candidates for 2002 and 2004. This dataset contains
information on each time an ad was shown by one of the national network affiliates. Along
with descriptive information about each ad, the authors of the dataset also estimate how
much it cost to show that ad.
We analyzed the number of ads and advertising expenditures by candidates in in-state vs.
out-of-state media markets. The results are presented in Table 2. As with news coverage, out-
of-state media markets suffer from a paucity of political coverage from campaign advertising.
There are 20 times fewer ads in out-of-state markets, and candidates spend 40 times less in
these markets.
NES Data
Further support for our research design comes from the National Election Studies. The 1974
and 1978 Senate studies have sufficient information to identify which people reside in in-state
and out-state media markets and their interest in the election and exposure to news.13 While
these questions are subject to over-reporting and are not as specific as we would like, they
do indicate a substantial difference in media exposure rates between respondents in in-state
and out-state markets.
In the 1974 data, about 70% of respondents living in counties with in-state media markets
report that they saw a Senate candidate on television during the campaign, compared to
only 50% of respondents living in counties with out-of-state media markets. This difference
12In order to use this data we must state the following: “The data was obtained from a project of
the Wisconsin Advertising Project, under Professor Kenneth Goldstein and Joel Rivlin of the University
of Wisconsin-Madison, and includes media tracking data from the Campaign Media Analysis Group in
Washington, D.C. The Wisconsin Advertising Project was sponsored by a grant from The Pew Charitable
Trusts. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the Wisconsin Advertising Project, Professor Goldstein, Joel Rivlin, or The Pew Charitable Trusts.”
13The only NES surveys to ask about contact with Senate candidates are the 1974 and 1978 surveys. The
Pooled Senate Election Study also contains such questions, but it does not county identifiers so we could not
determine the type of media market in which each respondent lived.
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of 20 percentage points is significant at the 0.01 level. Respondents living in out-of-state
media markets show the same levels of interest in and attentiveness to the campaign. They
differ, then, in the amount of information television provides.
The 1978 data set contains more detailed questions regarding contacts with Senate can-
didates. Once again, we find that respondents living in counties with out-of-state media
markets are 20 percentage points less likely to report seeing a Senate candidate on television
compared to those living in in-state media markets (90% to 70%, respectively). Respondents
reported the same level of contact with Senate candidates via mail and radio in both types
of counties.14
Free and paid media are the primary reasons that television, as a medium, is thought
to generally benefit incumbents. Ansolabehere, Behr, and Iyengar (1993), Prior (2002),
Erickson (1995), and others assert that the rise of television contributes to the incumbency
advantage through exactly these two mechanisms. If this effect is real and large enough
to explain a noticeable share of the incumbency advantage, then incumbents should enjoy
higher vote margins in in-state media markets than they do in out-of-state media markets.
2.2. Statistical Model and Data Processing
To measure the effect of television on electoral behavior, we contrast the difference in
incumbent vote margins in counties that are covered by in-state media and counties that
are covered by out-of-state media. We study Gubernatorial and Senatorial races. These are
the most prominent offices in a given state and have, by far, the largest amount of media
attention. Also, these two offices encompass the entire state and determining which markets
are inside the jurisdiction is straightforward - unlike some House districts. Although most of
the literature on this topic concerns House elections, the rise in the incumbency advantage
in Senatorial and Gubernatorial election parallels the House quite closely (Ansolabehere and
Snyder, 2002).
14There is some evidence of substitution at work. Respondents in counties with out-of-state media markets
were 30% more likely to report that they had contact with a Senate candidate or one of their staffers, or
attended a rally with a senate candidate, than respondents in counties with in-state media markets. These
results suggest that candidates severely curtail television advertising in those counties that are in out-of-state
media markets but sometimes attempt to counter this deficit by focusing on those counties in other ways.
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We use a statistical model of the incumbency effect developed by Levitt and Wolfram
(1997). Let i index offices, let j index counties, and let t index years. Let Vijt be the share
of the two-party vote received by the Democratic candidate running for office i in county j
contained in state k in year t. Let Iikt=1 if the Democratic candidate running for office i in
state k in year t is an incumbent, let Iikt=−1 if the Republican candidate running for office
i in state k in year t is an incumbent, and let Iikt=0 if the contest for office i in state k in
year t is an open-seat race. Then:
Vijt = αj + θt + βinIikt + ²ijt (1)
if j is in an in-state media market
Vijt = αj + θt + βoutIikt + ²ijt (2)
if j is in an out-of state media market. We then compare the coefficients βin and βout. We
allow all coefficients to vary by decade.
To capture the partisan division of counties and national partisan tides, the model in-
cludes separate year and county fixed-effects. The county fixed-effects capture the underlying
partisanship (normal vote) in each county, and the year fixed-effects capture national tides.
A potentially serious objection to this model is that partisanship moves in different direc-
tions in different counties across different years. This, and other objections, can be addressed
using slight variations on the specification. The results obtained using various alternative
specifications are presented in the Appendix (Table A.3). They are not significantly different
than the results reported in the body of the paper.
Estimating equations (1) and (2) by ordinary least-squares gives equal weight to each
county, no matter how small or large the county is. However, we are mainly interested in the
behavior of voters, not counties. We therefore estimated equation (1) and (2) via weighted
least squares, weighting by population. It is of course impossible to eliminate aggregation
bias simply via weighting, and some readers will prefer to see OLS estimates, so we present
unweighted results of all specifications in the Appendix (Tables A.5-A.7).
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Table 3 presents the definitions and filters we used in analyzing the data. Further infor-
mation on these filters, as well as information on the sources of the data, can be found in
Appendix B. Table 4 gives summary statistics on the data itself.
3. Results
Our basic results are summarized in Table 5. The most important figures are the differ-
ences between the level of the incumbency advantage in the two types of counties. If this
difference is negative, it means that the data indicate television lowered the incumbency
advantage. If it is positive, then television has increased the incumbency advantage.
The first column pools all the data, while the second and third columns focus on midterm
and presidential years, respectively. We analyzed these separately because the media situ-
ations might be quite different in those years. For example, the high intensity and vast
coverage of the presidential campaign might “crowd out” other campaigns.
The results tell a simple story. For the most part the difference in incumbency advantage
between the two types of counties is small and statistically insignificant. The difference also
does not seem to be increasing, so it is unlikely that the rise in incumbency advantage is
due to television. Finally, the difference is generally less than 25% of the total incumbency
advantage. In no cases were we able to reject the hypothesis that the incumbency advantage
in the two different kinds of counties was different, even at the 0.1 level. Looking at the
presidential and midterm years, we find that in only one case would we reject the null
hypothesis at the 0.01 level – elections in non-presidential years between 1986-1995. And
in this case the estimates indicate that television had a negative effect on the incumbency
advantage.15
A natural experiment, like this one, may have flaws that bias the results. The following
sections deal with the most likely sources of bias. We emphasize that all of the analyses that
follow support the results displayed in Table 5.
15There was no reason to believe a priori that television had a negative or positive effect on the incumbency
advantage, however a finding that television caused a decrease in the incumbency advantage would lead
there to be that much more of an incumbency advantage to explain. However, our data clearly indicate that
television has almost no effect either way on the incumbency advantage.
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The Rise of Cable Television
Local cable television stations in an “out-of-state” market might cover in-state politics.
Based on the information below, we believe that cable television is irrelevant to our study
frame, and cable news does not alter the general method developed here.
Cable television had virtually no market in any county before the mid-1980s, which is
the end of our study frame. Cable penetration had only reached 20% by 1980. By 1995 that
number had risen to 65% of homes with televisions, but cable accounted for only 46% of total
viewing hours (Eisenmann, 2000). Furthermore, the results we observed in the first three
decades of our study, when the impact of cable were negligible, do not differ significantly
from the last decade. If cable television had an impact on the incumbency advantage then
we would expect to see a different pattern in the first three decades of our study as opposed
to the fourth. No such pattern is supported by the data.
Furthermore, cable news programming didn’t exist until the mid 1980s and was not an
important medium until the mid-1990s (Thalhimer et. al., 2004). Ultimately, this paper
is about whether television viewing and news coverage might explain the emergence of the
incumbency advantage in the 1950s and 1960s and its expansion through the mid-1980s.
Cable comes on the scene long after the incumbency advantage.
Finally, the general method of comparison incorporates cable viewing in three ways.
First, the definition of the media market (DMA) incorporates cable and network viewing
behavior. If there was significant local cable viewing then this would effect the definition
of the county’s DMA. Second, local cable news receives trivial ratings today. It does not
reach enough viewers to affect elections. Third, cable news outlets do not appear to behave
differently than broadcast news with regards to incumbents. We have examined cable news
outlets (mainly FOX), and they too give much more coverage to the in-state governor. Cable
news coverage of elections is folded into the comparisons made in Table 1.
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Demographic Differences between Counties in In-State vs. Out-state Markets
Counties in out-of-state media markets are much smaller and less urban, and a bit poorer
than those in in-state media markets. These differences are not of particular concern since
at disaggregated levels these characteristics have not been found to be linked to the size of
the incumbency advantage. However, at a state level population has been linked to the size
of the incumbency advantage (e.g., Hibbing and Brandes, 1983). Differences in partisanship
– a factor that is clearly linked to they incumbency advantage – are small and generally
insignificant. Details of these differences can be found in Appendix A (Table A.1).
In order to assuage concerns that these differences might bias our results, we matched
the counties with out-of-state media markets to counties with in-state media markets on the
four dimensions below and estimated the size of the incumbency advantage using only the
matched counties. The results are summarized in the Appendix A (Table A.2). They are
not significantly different from our results without using matching. The results presented in
the rest of this paper do not employ matching in order to capitalize on the statistical power
of a larger data set.
Closeness of Race
Another possible source of bias is that media exposure, both paid and free, varies widely
across different elections based on the closeness of the race, and the strategies employed
by the candidates. For most years we do not know how much candidates spent on media
since candidate’s expenditure reports are at such widely varying levels of granularity. Some
of them itemize each expenditure, while others report only a single amount spent with a
consulting group that takes care of both the production of ads and the buying of air-time
(Stewart and Reynolds, 1990).
For 1970 and 1972, however, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) collected
data on how much each senate and gubernatorial candidate spent on television advertising.
We used this data to divide our sample into terciles based on the amount of money per capita
spent on television in that race. Media spending is an accurate proxy for the media exposure
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of a campaign. If our design covered up a difference in media effects by not incorporating
the relative media intensities of campaigns, it should show up in this analysis.
The results are summarized in Table 6. The difference in incumbency advantage between
the two types of counties varies quite a bit across the three terciles, but there is no discernible
pattern. The tercile with the highest media spending, and thus, media intensity, does not
have a larger (or positive) difference than the other terciles. The exact results are somewhat
sensitive to the thresholds used to define “High” vs. “Low” spending. In no case, however,
do the estimates exhibit a consistently and significantly higher incumbency advantage in the
counties dominated by in-state television. This indicates that the basic findings reported in
Table 5 are not masking the effects of varying media intensity.
A similar analysis can be done by dividing all of the data in our data set into quartiles
based on the closeness of the race. We could do this by using the observed ex-post closeness
of the race, but this raises endogeneity concerns as we would be dividing the data set by
the dependent variable of our regression. Instead, we use as a proxy for media intensity the
pre-election predictions reported in Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports (CQ).
Each election year, CQ makes predictions about how close a race is going to be and
who they believe will win the election. They always predict congressional, and occasionally
gubernatorial, races. For the years 1956-1976 they used what is effectively a three point
scale to judge race closeness. This ranged from the closest (Doubtful, or No Clear Favorite
depending on year) to the least competitive (Safe Democratic or Safe Republican). The CQ
predictions take media intensity into effect, as the comments that go along with each race
often point to high media intensity or well funded competitors in justifying the call. More
details of this data can be found in Appendix B.
Table 7 presents the results of using these predictions to separate races of varying degrees
of competitiveness.16 The tightly contested races – those that in general will have a higher
media intensity than less contested races – show no discernible increase in the incumbency
16The number of observations is different than that in previous tables because CQ usually does not make
predictions about gubernatorial races.
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advantage due to television. If anything, they show a slight, and statistically insignificant,
decrease in the incumbency advantage due to television.
Finally, as noted above, we present unweighted (OLS) versions of Tables 5-7 in Appendix
A (Tables A.4 - A.6, respectively). The results are generally similar to the weighted results,
and the overall conclusion to draw from them is the same.
4. Conclusion
Our results strongly suggest that the rise of the incumbency advantage had little to do
with television. We find that television has a small, directionally indeterminate, and statisti-
cally insignificant effect on the incumbency advantage. Since the growth of the incumbency
advantage in the US Senate and Governorships parallels that in the US House, the state
legislatures, and executive offices we believe that our results are indicative of those that
would be found with these other offices.
The methodology developed in this paper can be readily extended to other settings.
Specifically, it is possible to conduct a similar analysis for U.S. House districts. That analysis
is not performed here as some adjustments would be needed in order to account for the small
number of house districts with both in and out of state media. One might also use this
approach to measure the effects of media coverage on other sorts of political outcomes, such
as turnout or, using survey data, individuals’ attitudes and perceptions of competition.
It is also important to point out what we have not shown.
We have not shown that campaigns have no effect on the incumbency advantage – only
that television, as a campaign medium, is no more effective at conveying an incumbency
advantage than any other type of campaigning. Our findings are consistent with those in
Ansolabehere, Gerber and Snyder (2002), who find that when congressional candidates face
high costs of television advertising they substitute strongly into other forms of communica-
tion, such as direct mail.
Our finding only applies to the effect of television campaign ads and television news
coverage of specific electoral contests, not the broader effect of television on American culture
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or politics. Specifically, we have compared counties that received campaign ads and news
coverage of elections with those that did not. We did not compare counties where there were
no televisions to counties with televisions (indeed, we could not, as television was in nearly
every county by the late 1950s).
Another argument holds that television changed politics itself. The “insider” orientation
of television news may stimulate people to think more highly of incumbents or to think that
incumbency matters a lot and they should vote for incumbents whenever they see them.
Television coverage of politics and campaigns might produce a general, pro-incumbent mes-
sage – more pro-incumbent than other media – helping incumbents running in all offices.
Television might also cause other news media to change their messages in a pro-incumbent
direction. We cannot rule out the hypothesis that television caused the incumbency ad-
vantage by promoting incumbents in general across the country, because our comparison is
based on within state comparisons.
This cultural argument, however, is different than the standard arguments. The usual ar-
guments – and the claims made in the existing empirical literature – involve biased coverage
and unequal resources for television advertising, which varies race by race. The arguments
are of the form: “Individual incumbents receive more television coverage than their oppo-
nents, and/or they receive more favorable coverage, and/or they spend more on television
advertising, affecting the voting behavior of voters in that race.” The arguments are not of
the form: “television coverage is generally pro-incumbent, so all voters think more highly of
all incumbents and vote for them a bit more than they would have otherwise (even though
they have not seen specific messages from or about most of these incumbents).”
Demonstrating that such a shift has occurred requires a much broader comparison –
across countries. But, when one looks abroad, there is an obvious problem with the hy-
pothesis that television is a key driver of the incumbency advantage in the United States.
Television is ubiquitous in advanced industrial democracies, but few countries have incum-
bency advantages estimated to be more than one or two percentage points. Even those with
similar electoral systems, such as Britain and Canada, have trivial incumbency advantages.
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It is easy to suspect television as the culprit behind the large shift in American electoral
politics that occurred in the 1950s and 1990s. But the evidence of an actual connection is
slight. The search for the cause of the incumbency advantage in the United States, then,
should focus on other changes in our institutions, culture, or politics.
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Appendix A: Detailed Statistical Treatment
This appendix addresses three statistical issues raised in the text. First, as mentioned in
Section 3, there are significant differences between counties with in-state media markets and
those with out-of-state media markets. We corrected for this difference by matching counties
along each of the four dimensions summarized in Table A.1. We matched each out-of-
state county with the in-state county that had the most similar demographic characteristics.
Thus, the averages for the counties in in-state and out-of-state markets along each dimension
became statistically indistinguishable. The results are summarized below in Table A.2. As
reported above, controlling for these factors had no real effect on our main result – the
difference in incumbency advantage due to television is small and statistically insignificant.
Second, as mentioned in Section 2, our method exploits the panel-data structure of two
features of American elections. These features are (1) The United States holds many elections
for any one type of office at one time, and (2) these elections occur at regular intervals. The
results in the body of the paper do not exploit a third feature of American elections: the fact
that the United States holds many elections within a given state or county at the same time.
Since we examine both Senatorial and Gubernatorial elections we can exploit this feature
to some extent; however, since we examine only these two types of elections our ability to
exploit this feature is limited.
Exploiting these features allows us to avoid statistical problems associated with estimat-
ing a normal vote. We take this normal vote into account by using year fixed effects to
exploit the first feature above, and county fixed effects to exploit the second feature above.
If we were able to exploit the third feature above, we would be able to use a combined
county-year fixed effect. However, we believe that estimating county and year fixed effects
separately is also valid, since the normal vote varies much across counties in a given year
than it does over time in a given county.17
The three formulas below correspond to the three columns of Table A.3. Let i index
offices, j index counties, and t index years. Let Vijt be the share of the two-party vote
17For more details, see Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002).
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received by the Democratic candidate running for office i in county j contained in state k in
year t. Let Iikt=1 if the Democratic candidate running for office i in state k in year t is an
incumbent, let Iikt=−1 if the Republican candidate running for office i in state k in year t
is an incumbent, and let Iikt=0 if the contest for office i in state k in year t is an open-seat
race. Additionally let year t be in decade d. Then:
Vijt = αjt + βiIikt + ²ijt (3)
Vijt = αjd + θt + βiIijkt + ²ijt (4)
Vijt = αj + θtk + βiIikt + ²ijt (5)
As in the body of the paper, we estimate each equation separately for counties in in-state and
out-of-state dominated media markets. We also allow the parameters to vary each decade.
Finally, the last two tables in the appendix are the unweighted (OLS) versions of Tables
5 - 7 in the main body of the paper. These tables use year and county fixed effects, as do
all the tables in the main body of the paper. We number these tables A.4 - A.6.
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Appendix B: Data
County-level election returns are from ICPSR study number 13 (General Election Data
for the United States, 1950-1990), and America Votes (1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000).
Incumbency status is from a variety of sources (see Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2002, for
details).
Media market definitions are from Broadcast and Cable (1970, 1980, 1990, 2000). We were
unable to procure data on media market boundaries for the 1950s. However, media market
boundaries have changed very little over the period that we did have data for, so we used
media market information from the late 60s for the beginning part of our study. The most
likely change to the media market structure would have been that the less populous areas
had no established media markets. This would only be an issue for the years 1956-1960 in
our study, since 90% of families owned television sets by 1960. Removing the least populous
media markets for the early years of our study did not significantly effect our results. The
effect of television on the incumbency advantage was still small (0.32%), and statistically
insignificant.
We defined the dominant state of a media market to be the state that had at least 2
3
of the
population of that media market. Likewise, we defined a county to be in a media market that
was out-of-state dominated if the state the county was in had less than 1
3
of the population
of the media market. We drop all counties that did not fall into one of these categories. We
can include all counties by dropping the threshold for being classified as in-state dominated
from 2
3
to 1
2
and raising the threshold to be considered out-of-state dominated from 1
3
to 1
2
.
Doing so does not significantly effect the results. We experimented with other thresholds
as well (e.g., 3
5
and 2
5
, 9
10
and 1
10
) and in all cases found results similar to those reported in
Table 5.
Some markets are not centered in a single state. For example, a large fraction of the
population of the St. Louis, Missouri, media market resides in Illinois. It is difficult to
assert that the news directors in such markets will focus on just their own state. We omit
such markets from the analysis in this paper - we focus only on media markets that are
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disproportionately in one state.
Occasionally a county may change from an in-state media market to one that is out-of-
state. Since we only collected media market at the beginning of each decade, this creates
difficulty in classifying the county in the years in between. In order to avoid this difficulty, we
dropped these counties from the analysis for the decade when their status was indeterminate.
Including these counties in the media market they were in at the beginning or end of the
decade did not qualitatively change the results in Table 5.
In some states, only a small percentage of the population lives in a media market that
is dominated in-state. We dropped all counties in states where less than two-thirds of the
population lived in in-state dominated media markets – we call these states “overwhelmed”
by out-of-state media. The reasoning is that politicians would not neglect TV advertising to
such a large percentage of voters and hence would advertise in out-of-state media markets.
Additionally, there is anecdotal evidence that overwhelmed states will have smaller stations
that simply do not garner a majority of the viewing audience. Again, varying the threshold
has only minor effects on our results.
In 1980, the states fell into the following categories: DE, IN, KS, KY, MD, MO, ND, NH,
NJ, RI, WV, and WY were “overwhelmed,” ME, TX, and UT had only in-state dominated
counties, and the rest had both in-state dominated and out-of-state dominated counties (AL,
AR, AZ, CA, CO, CT, FL, GA, IA, ID, IL, MA, MI, MN, MS, MT, NC, NE, NH, NM, NV,
NY, OH, OK, OR, PA, SC, SD, TN, VA, VT, WA, WI).
There are some important notes on the data we collected from CQ. For 1960-1964 CQ used
what is effectively a five point scale, however, the names of the ratings put the two additional
points between the three others generally used throughout this period. Including these in-
between calls in one or the other surrounding closeness categories did not significantly change
the results. Additionally, 1972 used a two point scale and was excluded from this analysis.
Between 1978 and 1992, CQ switched to what is essentially a four point scale for race
closeness. The scoring system used in 1994 is difficult to normalize across seats held by
Democrats and Republicans. The data for 1976 is omitted because it uses a 3 point scale.
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Figure 1: Massachusetts in 1980
Figure 2: Illinois in 1980
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Table 1: Summary of Media Market Data
Number of In-State Average # Out-of-State Average #
Stations Hits Per Market Hits Per Market
All Markets 91 10,675 210 1,045 20
10 Most Populous Markets in Sample
In-State Out-of-State
Media Market Station Hits Governor Hits Governor
Chicago, IL WBBM 95 Blagojevich 15 IN: O’Bannon, Kernan1
WLS 280 Blagojevich 44 IN: O’Bannon, Kernan1
Atlanta, GA WGNX 222 Perdue 6 AL: Riley
WXIA 100 Perdue 2 AL: Riley
Pittsburgh, PA WTAE 82 Rendell 7 MD: Ehrlich
KDKA 133 Rendell 4 MD: Ehrlich
Denver, CO KCNC 250 Owens 4 NE: Johanns
KMGH 80 Owens 1 NE: Johanns
KUSA 50 Owens 5 NE: Johanns
Salt Lake City, UT KSL 630 Leavitt, Walker 2 ID: Kempthorne
0 NV: Guinn
KTVX 32 Leavitt, Walker 1 ID: Kempthorne
0 NV: Guinn
Raleigh, NC WNCN 89 Easley 13 VA: Warner
Nashville, TN WSMV 500 Bredesen 22 KY: Patton, Fletcher
WTUV 114 Bredesen 0 KY: Patton, Fletcher
Buffalo, NY WIVB 100 Pataki 1 PA: Randell
WGRZ 3 Pataki 0 PA: Randell
ct New Orleans, LA WDSU 31 Blanco, Foster 1 MS: Barbour, Musgrove
WWLT 399 Blanco, Foster 9 MS: Barbour, Musgrove
Albuquerque, NM KOAT 188 Richardson 3 CO: Owens
0 AZ: Napolitano
KOB 24 Richardson 1 CO: Owens
1 AZ: Napolitano
1 IN Governor O’Bannon died during the period surveyed - most articles are about his death.
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Table 2: Advertising in In-state vs. Out-of-state Media Markets
Senate Governor Total
In-State Out-of-State In-State Out-of-State In-State Out-of-State
2000
Avg. Ads 3,584 34 5,228 413 3,790 139
Avg. Expenditure $2,751,704 $16,994 $2,526,207 $192,685 $2,723,517 $65,460
n 56 21 8 8 64 29
2002
Avg. Ads 4,225 116 7,311 614 6,093 370
Avg. Expenditure $2,321,108 $52,314 $5,425,931 $211,894 $4,200,343 $133,733
n 45 24 69 25 114 49
Table 3: Filters and Definitions Used in Analysis
Filter Definition Used in Paper Notes
Out-of-State < 13 media market Changing threshold
population in state does not alter results
In-State > 23 media market Changing threshold
population in state does not alter results
If no state has > 23 , discard data
Flipped Discard if county changes Including/Discarding does
media market during decade not alter results
Overwhlemed State with no in-state Candidates in these states are likely
media markets to advertise in out-state markets
Table 4: Summary of Data by Decade
Actual Sample2
In-State Out-of-State In-State Out-of-State
Total Media Media Over- Media Media
Decade1 Counties Market Market Flipped whelmed Market Market
1960 3,030 2,069 531 189 1,079 1,457 239
1970 3,037 2,105 512 187 917 1,567 253
1980 3,045 2,166 482 166 842 1,657 270
1990 3,022 2,197 453 124 801 1,703 263
1 We collected the data in this table at the beginning of each decade
2 Sample after removing all Flipped and Overwhelmed counties
Note: In-State and Out-of-State categories do not add up to total; residual category is set of
counties where dominating state is unclear
Note: Independent Cities (in VA), Baltimore City, and St. Louis City counted as counties
Note: AK, HI, and counties with less than 1,000 votes were dropped
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Table 5: Weighted Estimates of Incumbency
Advantage in Different Media Environments
Non-Pres. Presidential
All Years Election Year Election Year
1956-1965
With In-State Media 2.41 1.88 3.50
(0.31) (0.44) (0.65)
With Out-of-State Media 2.92 2.40 3.91
(0.46) (0.66) (0.81)
Difference 0.24 -0.52 -0.41
F -0.87 0.43 0.16
n 9,109 3,722 5,387
1966-1975
With In-State Media 4.37 4.46 6.16
(0.40) (0.49) (0.83)
With Out-of-State Media 4.30 3.51 5.33
(0.68) (0.94) (1.04)
Difference -0.07 0.95 1.03
F 0.01 0.84 0.41
n 9,748 6,406 3,342
1976-1985
With In-State Media 5.55 5.24 8.73
(0.33) (0.42) (0.63)
With Out-of-State Media 4.83 5.53 5.60
(0.59) (0.87) (1.18)
Difference 0.72 -0.29 3.13
F 1.16 0.10 6.03
n 9,356 5,036 4,320
1986-1995
With In-State Media 7.43 7.19 8.05
(0.25) (0.31) (0.65)
With Out-of-State Media 8.22 9.40 6.18
(0.52) (0.65) (1.06)
Difference -0.79 -2.21 1.87
F 1.86 9.17 2.28
n 11,107 8,091 3,016
Bold = significant at the 0.01 level
Italics = significant at the 0.1 level
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Table 6: Weighted Estimates of Incumbency Advantage
by TV Spending Per Capita for 1970 & 1972
Least Most
Expensive Middle Expensive All
Tercile Tercile Tercile Data
With In-State Media 4.85 6.64 11.97 6.51
(2.09) (3.36) (1.76) (0.79)
With Out-of-State Media 17.27 14.00 12.33 9.90
(1.90) (5.45) (2.37) (2.18)
Difference -12.42 -7.36 -0.36 -3.39
F 54.26 7.46 0.02 2.10
n 1,296 1,292 1,201 3,867
Bold = significant at the 0.01 level
Italics = significant at the 0.1 level
29
Table 7: Weighted Estimates of Incumbency Advantage
By Competitiveness of Race, 1956-1995
Competetiveness Category
High Medium Low All
1956-1965
With In-State Media -1.24 3.00 5.31 2.31
(0.36) (0.61) (1.41) (0.33)
With Out-of-State Media -1.47 3.28 3.73 3.04
(0.54) (0.80) (3.54) (0.48)
Difference 0.23 -0.28 1.77 -0.73
F 0.15 0.09 0.17 1.60
n 2,216 3,003 2,961 8,180
1966-1975
With In-State Media 3.85 2.08 6.14 4.31
(1.49) (0.57) (2.67) (0.41)
With Out-of-State Media 1.52 2.74 3.74 4.06
(1.66) (0.85) (2.15) (0.64)
Difference 2.33 -0.66 3.40 0.25
F 2.09 0.47 7.02 0.11
n 2,026 4,115 1,696 7,837
High Med 1 Med 2 Low All
1976-1985
With In-State Media 2.96 5.46 2.12 1.92 6.40
(0.92) (1.10) (0.95) (2.63) (0.33)
With Out-of-State Media 1.49 3.70 2.89 13.20 5.00
(1.41) (2.07) (1.35) (4.49) (0.57)
Difference 1.47 1.76 -0.77 -11.28 1.40
F 1.61 0.74 0.23 4.70 5.02
n 1,154 2,487 2,187 1,587 7,415
1986-1995
With In-State Media 1.54 5.40 22.82 6.33
(0.75) (0.88) (2.69) (0.46)
With Out-of-State Media Not 2.01 8.11 22.61 5.53
Enough (0.86) (5.63) (2.12) (0.82)
Difference Data 0.47 -2.71 0.21 0.80
F 0.19 0.23 0.02 0.73
n 1,907 1,173 1,352 4,798
Bold = significant at the 0.01 level
Italics = significant at the 0.1 level
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Table A.1: Summary Statistics of Counties with
In-State vs. Out-of-State Media Markets
In-State Out-of-State
Decade Media Market Media Market Difference
Population
1960 87,236 28,288 58,948
1970 94,811 34,328 60,482
1980 102,338 32,802 69,536
1990 102,930 35,917 67,012
Median Income
1960 $5,761 $5,311 $450
1970 $10,490 $9,615 $875
1980 $20,647 $18,671 $1,976
1990 $28,963 $26,765 $2,197
Pct. Urban
1960 38.73% 26.44% 12.29%
1970 40.57% 29.02% 11.55%
1980 40.73% 28.60% 12.12%
1990 40.63% 29.67% 10.96%
Democrat P.
1960 52.59% 52.27% 0.32%
1970 50.90% 51.76% 0.86%
1980 47.98% 48.60% 0.62%
1990 46.71% 48.46% 1.76%
Bold = significant at the 0.01 level
Italics = significant at the 0.1 level
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Table A.2: Estimates of Incumbency Advantage
Controlling for Properties of Counties
Median Urban Democratic
Population Income Percentage Percentage
1956-1965
With In-State Media 3.45 2.99 3.45 2.01
(0.52) (0.56) (0.52) (0.64)
With Out-of-State Media 2.88 2.95 2.93 2.75
(0.46) (0.48) (0.46) (0.53)
Difference 0.57 0.04 0.52 -0.74
F 0.69 0.00 0.54 0.95
n 2,898 2,966 2,927 2,907
1966-1975
With In-State Media 3.74 4.73 4.00 3.97
(0.53) (0.67) (0.56) (1.18)
With Out-of-State Media 4.33 4.27 4.33 4.03
(0.65) (0.69) (0.66) (0.74)
Difference -0.59 0.46 -0.33 -0.06
F 0.69 0.24 0.15 0.00
n 3,096 3,031 3,136 3084
1976-1985
With In-State Media 5.80 5.06 6.11 3.72
(0.59) (0.92) (0.56) (1.50)
With Out-of-State Media 5.55 5.60 5.36 4.66
(0.56) (0.65) (0.58) (0.94)
Difference 0.15 -0.54 0.75 -0.94
F 0.10 0.28 0.95 0.28
n 3,156 3,104 3,210 2,997
1986-1995
With In-State Media 9.30 7.84 9.35 8.41
(0.55) (0.50) (0.57) (0.77)
With Out-of-State Media 8.25 8.09 8.24 8.16
(0.56) (0.54) (0.58) (0.62)
Difference 1.05 -0.25 1.09 0.25
F 1.91 0.12 1.96 0.06
n 3,559 3,568 3,665 3,510
Bold = significant at the 0.01 level
Italics = significant at the 0.1 level
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Table A.3: Estimates of Incumbency Advantage
Using Different Fixed Effect Models
County- County- State-Year
Year Decade & Year & County
1956-1965
With In-State Media 3.37 3.23 3.42
(0.65) (0.39) (0.44)
With Out-of-State Media 4.39 3.39 3.48
(0.62) (0.60) (0.47)
Difference -0.98 -0.17 0.06
F 1.29 0.05 0.01
n 9,109 9,109 9,109
1966-1975
With In-State Media 6.97 5.08 6.90
(0.70) (0.43) (0.44)
With Out-of-State Media 5.35 5.05 6.64
(1.07) (0.70) (0.61)
Difference 1.62 0.03 0.26
F 1.61 0.00 0.20
n 9,748 9,748 9,748
1976-1985
With In-State Media 4.48 5.94 4.51
(0.62) (0.40) (0.35)
With Out-of-State Media 4.44 5.25 3.74
(1.13) (0.68) (0.46)
Difference 0.04 0.69 0.77
F 0.00 0.83 4.10
n 9,356 9,356 9,225
1986-1995
With In-State Media 7.23 6.88 7.28
(0.47) (0.27) (0.30)
With Out-of-State Media 8.77 7.63 7.47
(1.11) (0.53) (0.48)
Difference 1.54 -0.75 -0.19
F 1.62 1.59 0.16
n 11,107 11,107 10,822
Bold = significant at the 0.01 level
Italics = significant at the 0.1 level
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Table A.4: OLS Estimates of Incumbency Advantage
in Different Media Environments
All Non-Pres. Pres.
Data Election Year Election Year
1956-1965
With In-State Media 3.18 2.71 4.14
(0.11) (0.19) (0.17)
With Out-of-State Media 3.38 3.62 3.94
(0.23) (0.44) (0.31)
Difference -0.20 -0.91 0.20
F 0.66 3.61 0.32
n 9,109 3,722 5,387
1966-1975
With In-State Media 4.85 4.59 6.94
(0.14) (0.16) (0.35)
With Out-of-State Media 4.00 3.42 4.54
(0.30) (0.41) (0.71)
Difference -0.85 1.17 2.40
F 6.89 7.21 9.66
n 9,751 6,406 3,345
1976-1985
With In-State Media 5.77 4.22 9.10
(0.13) (0.17) (0.26)
With Out-of-State Media 5.48 5.41 7.09
(0.31) (0.54) (0.60)
Difference 0.28 -1.19 2.01
F 0.72 4.52 9.78
n 9,358 5,038 4,320
1986-1995
With In-State Media 7.39 6.88 6.95
(0.12) (0.13) (0.44)
With Out-of-State Media 7.36 7.96 5.38
(0.29) (0.36) (0.80)
Difference 0.03 -1.08 1.57
F 0.01 8.08 2.93
n 11,110 8,094 3,016
Bold = significant at the 0.01 level
Italics = significant at the 0.1 level
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Table A.5: OLS Estimates of Incumbency Advantage
by TV Spending Per Capita for 1970 & 1972
Least Most
Expensive Middle Expensive All
Tercile Tercile Tercile Data
With In-State Media 12.04 3.64 8.09 5.81
(0.73) (2.37) (1.30) (0.23)
With Out-of-State Media 15.60 8.15 10.47 5.79
(6.92) (3.81) (3.17) (0.89)
Difference -3.56 -4.51 -2.38 0.02
F 0.26 2.86 0.50 0.00
n 1,296 1,295 1,201 3,870
Bold = significant at the 0.01 level
Italics = significant at the 0.1 level
35
Table A.6: OLS Estimates of Incumbency Advantage
By Competitiveness of Race, 1956-1995
Competetiveness Category
Low Medium High All
1956-1965
With In-State Media -0.65 3.75 3.11 3.15
(0.21) (0.22) (0.70) (0.12)
With Out-of-State Media -0.65 4.80 2.27 3.50
(0.36) (0.51) (2.06) (0.24)
Difference 0.01 -1.05 1.05 -0.35
F 0.00 4.13 0.15 1.79
n 2,216 3,003 2,961 8,180
1966-1975
With In-State Media 2.55 2.21 7.26 4.30
(0.57) (0.23) (0.76) (0.14)
With Out-of-State Media 1.58 3.39 5.78 3.81
(1.42) (0.52) (0.93) (0.31)
Difference 0.97 -1.18 1.48 0.49
F 0.43 4.48 4.01 2.17
n 2,026 4,115 1,696 7,837
Low Med 1 Med 2 High All
1976-1985
With In-State Media 2.30 3.13 4.97 0.12 5.31
(0.85) (0.52) (0.66) (0.94) (0.16)
With Out-of-State Media 1.46 2.68 2.73 6.09 5.60
(1.26) (0.75) (1.60) (2.49) (0.36)
Difference 0.84 0.45 -2.24 -5.97 -0.29
F 0.61 0.42 1.77 4.81 0.62
n 1,154 2,489 2,187 1,587 7,417
1986-1995
With In-State Media 2.93 5.82 22.96 7.76
(0.49) (0.14) (1.86) (0.21)
With Out-of-State Media Not 3.25 8.37 21.73 5.66
Enough (0.63) (0.43) (1.10) (0.54)
Difference Data -0.32 -2.55 1.23 2.10
F 0.19 0.36 0.67 13.39
n 1,907 1,173 1,353 4,799
Bold = significant at the 0.01 level
Italics = significant at the 0.1 level
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